The 28
What Turkish Courts Martial Reveal About Atrocities in the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation
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Foreword
This article documents individual crimes committed by Turkish soldiers during the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation. It does not equate these crimes with the systematic, societally-driven, state-directed genocide committed by Greek and Greek Cypriot forces against Turkish Cypriots between 1963-1974 - a campaign that also targeted the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) during the intervention. It does, however, apply the same forensic standard to both sides: documented evidence, not allegation. The evidence presented here comes from Turkish military archives, UNFICYP internal memos, and contemporary reporting. These are not “atrocity fantasies.” They are documented violations - and they were prosecuted.
Introduction
Between 20-22 July and 14-16 August 1974, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) conducted a two-phase military intervention on the island of Cyprus, invoking the Right to Intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee, the inherent right of self-defense and the right to defend others (a recognized principle in customary international law), and the humanitarian imperative to stop an ongoing genocide of Turkish Cypriots - in accordance with its obligations under domestic and international law, including the Geneva Conventions (1949).
The Greek government and its proxy Greek Cypriot administration’s December 1963 coup… Greek junta and its Greek Cypriot proxy’s July 1974 coup - and the eleven years of enclavement, starvation, and systematic violence that preceded it - constituted both aggression (the supreme international crime under the Nuremberg principles) and genocide (the greatest crime under the 1948 Genocide Convention).
The operation was lawful in its inception and proportionate in its scope. It toppled the fascist military dictatorship in Athens and the Greek junta-installed Sampson regime, prevented the completion of the Aphrodite Plan - the “final solution” to “the Turkish problem,” and secured a safe zone for Turkish Cypriots who had been subjected to eleven years of veritable siege, starvation, and systematic taxonomic violence.
None of that excuses individual war crimes.
The Turkish military is a professional force with a strict code of discipline and conduct. Its rules of engagement emphasized distinction between combatants and civilians, proportionality, and respect for the laws of war. By and large its soldiers complied.
But some did not.
This article documents what happened to those who broke rank. It is based on Turkish military court martial records, UNFICYP internal memoranda, and contemporary reporting. The evidence is limited - not because crimes were widespread, but because the Turkish military investigated and prosecuted the cases that came to light.
The contrast with the Greek / Greek Cypriot side is instructive: where Greek / Greek Cypriot perpetrators of atrocities were promoted, awarded, and integrated into the state apparatus, Turkish perpetrators were court-martialed, imprisoned, and dismissed.
This article does not celebrate that contrast. It simply reports it.
The Legal Framework
Turkish military law, like that of all NATO members, incorporates the Geneva Conventions (1949) and their Additional Protocols. Türkiye - as a signatory to various other agreements, treaties and conventions - further consolidates these obligations, reflecting them in its domestic law and in the internal regulations of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), which explicitly prohibit:
Killing of civilians who are not taking a direct part in hostilities.
Rape or sexual violence of any kind.
Looting or pillage of civilian property.
Torture or inhuman treatment of prisoners of war.
Collective punishment.
Violations of these prohibitions are subject to court martial, with penalties ranging from imprisonment to dismissal and, in cases of murder or rape, life imprisonment.
During the course of both phases of the Cyprus Peace Operation, and the ceasefire period between the end of the first phase (22 July) and the beginning of the second phase (14 August), the TAF deployed approximately 40,000 troops. Of these, 28 were prosecuted for criminal offenses. The prosecution rate - 0.07% - reflects the number of documented cases. Whether this is “low” or “high” is not just a matter of statistics, but also judgment. What is not a matter of judgment is that these cases were investigated and prosecuted, unlike on the Greek / Greek Cypriot side. And they are consistent with military operations of similar scale and duration. It is not evidence of widespread atrocity. It is evidence of a functioning military justice system.
Documented Cases: What We Know
The Turkish military archives on the 1974 operation remain partially classified. However, declassified summaries, UNFICYP internal memos, and contemporary reporting (including by Turkish journalists embedded with the forces) provide a partial picture.
The following cases have been documented:
Case 1: Looting and Theft (Multiple soldiers, locations unspecified)
The most common offense was looting - soldiers stealing personal property from abandoned Greek / Greek Cypriot homes and shops. Turkish military records indicate that approximately 15 of the 28 prosecutions were for looting. Sentences ranged from 6 months to 2 years imprisonment, with dismissal from service.
Source: Turkish General Staff Archives, declassified summary (2005); UNFICYP internal memo (15 September 1974, cited in S/11593 annex).
Case 2: Rape (Three soldiers, village near Lefkoşa / Nicosia, August 1974)
Three Turkish soldiers were prosecuted for the rape of a Greek / Greek Cypriot woman in a village near Lefkoşa during the second phase of the operation. The soldiers were arrested by their own commanding officer after the victim’s family filed a complaint through UNFICYP. A military court sentenced all three to 15 years imprisonment. Their fate after sentencing is unknown (Turkish military records do not indicate early release).
Source: UNFICYP incident log, 14 August 1974; Turkish military court martial record, case no. TSK-1974-89 (cited in declassified summary).
Note on evidentiary standards: Unlike the Greek / Greek Cypriot allegations documented in The Sun and The Sunday Times - which were sensationalized, and lacked forensic evidence, corroboration, or investigation - this case was investigated by UNFICYP, documented in Turkish military records, and resulted in prosecution. The victim’s testimony was corroborated by medical examination (UNFICYP medical officer) and witness statements.
Case 3: Killing of a Greek / Greek Cypriot civilian (Baf / Paphos region, July 1974)
A Turkish soldier shot and killed a Greek / Greek Cypriot civilian who failed to stop at a checkpoint during the first phase of the operation. The soldier claimed he believed the civilian was a combatant (many Greek / Greek Cypriot forces were wearing civilian clothes, and there were also large numbers of civilian combatants supporting the Greek / Greek Cypriot forces). The court martial found that the soldier had violated rules of engagement by using deadly force without verbal warning. He was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and dismissed from service.
Source: Turkish military court martial record, case no. TSK-1974-42; UNFICYP incident log, 24 July 1974.
Case 4: Torture / Abuse of prisoners of war (Lefkoşa / Nicosia area, August 1974)
Two Turkish soldiers were prosecuted for beating Greek / Greek Cypriot prisoners of war who were being held in a transit camp. The prisoners had been captured during the second phase of the operation. The beatings were witnessed by a Turkish officer, who intervened and reported the soldiers. Both were sentenced to 2 years imprisonment.
Source: Turkish military court martial record, case no. TSK-1974-112; UNFICYP inspection report, 19 August 1974.
Case 5: Attempted rape (Girne / Kyrenia area, August 1974)
A Turkish soldier attempted to rape a Greek / Greek Cypriot woman who was sheltering in a church with other civilians. The woman screamed; other soldiers intervened and detained the perpetrator. He was court-martialed, sentenced to 12 years imprisonment, and dismissed.
Source: Turkish military court martial record, case no. TSK-1974-97; contemporary reporting by Milliyet newspaper, 25 August 1974.
What the Court Martial Records Do Not Show
The 28 prosecutions represent the documented cases. They do not represent all the alleged violations. Some violations may have also gone unreported. Some victims may have been unwilling or unable to come forward. Some commanders may have chosen internal discipline over court martial.
However, the following is also true:
No evidence exists of systematic, state-ordered atrocities. The prosecutions were initiated by Turkish military authorities, not by external pressure. Commanding officers arrested their own soldiers. Decades of investigation by the CMP, UNFICYP, and ECHR have found no such evidence - despite active searching.
No evidence exists of mass rape as a weapon of war. The three documented rape cases are individual criminal acts against a single Greek / Greek Cypriot woman, not state policy. The soldiers were arrested by their own commanding officer after the victim’s family filed a complaint through UNFICYP. Another attempted rape of another Greek / Greek Cypriot woman was stopped by other Turkish soldiers.
No evidence exists of mass executions of civilians. The single documented civilian killing (Case 3) was ruled excessive use of force at a checkpoint, not a planned execution.
No evidence exists of Turkish military orders authorizing or encouraging atrocities. The rules of engagement explicitly prohibited them.
The contrast with the Greek / Greek Cypriot side is absolute. Greek / Greek Cypriot forces operated under state orders (Akritas, Gronthos, Aphrodite plans) that explicitly targeted Turkish Cypriot civilians for subjugation or extermination. The perpetrators were not prosecuted. They were aided and abetted by civilians through integration, compliance or omission of accountability. They were societally-driven and supported. They were promoted. Some received medals. Others were integrated into the police, the Greek-officered Greek Cypriot National Guard, and the civil service.
The Turkish side prosecuted its criminals. The Greek / Greek Cypriot side celebrated its criminals.
That is not a moral judgment. It is a documented fact.
The ECHR’s Role in Documenting Individual Violations
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has ruled on several cases involving Turkish military conduct in Cyprus. These rulings are cited in UN documents and provide additional documentation of individual violations.
Solomou v. Turkey (2008): Turkish forces killed a Greek / Greek Cypriot civilian trespassing through the buffer zone and into the TRNC, before climbing a flagpole in order to remove a Turkish flag from its mast. Türkiye - the state considered as exercising effective control over northern Cyprus - was held responsible. The ECHR found the killing disproportionate; the use of deadly force was not justified, as Solomou posed no immediate threat to life, and a violation of Article 2 (right to life).
There are other cases frequently cited against Türkiye as proof of its deficiency, such as Güzelyurtlu & Others v. Cyprus & Turkey (2019), but in this the ECHR was equally critical of the rump Greek Cypriot administration, finding against both sides.
Güzelyurtlu & Others v. Cyprus & Turkey (2019): Both the rump Greek Cypriot administration and Türkiye failed to properly investigate murders of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots between 1996-1999. The ruling also found that the rump Greek Cypriot administration - regarded as the Republic of Cyprus, had failed to investigate murders of Turkish Cypriots on its territory, and that Türkiye - as the state it considered as exercising effective control over northern Cyprus, failed to investigate murders of Greeks / Greek Cypriots in the TRNC. The symmetry is not perfect - the ECHR was critical of both, but for different reasons. The ruling is significant because it found both sides deficient - not because it identified state-directed violence by either.
What the ECHR has NOT found:
Systematic rape or sexual violence by Turkish forces.
Mass executions of civilians.
Genocide or crimes against humanity.
State-directed atrocities.
The ECHR’s findings are limited to individual violations, failure to investigate, and effective control responsibilities. These are not trivial - but they are not genocide.
The Asymmetry of Accountability
The asymmetry documented above is best understood by placing the evidentiary records side by side. The following list summarizes this, drawing exclusively on the UN and ECHR documents cited throughout this article. Each entry answers one question: “what does the record contain - and what does it not contain?” This does not adjudicate morality. It inventories evidence.
Documented systematic state-directed atrocities
Turkish / Turkish Cypriot Side: None
Greek / Greek Cypriot Side: Akritas, Gronthos, Aphrodite plans
Mass graves
Turkish / Turkish Cypriot Side: None
Greek / Greek Cypriot Side: Confirmed by UN/ICRC
Autopsy reports
Turkish / Turkish Cypriot Side: None
Greek / Greek Cypriot Side: Documented executions, torture, mutilation
Prosecutions of own forces
Turkish / Turkish Cypriot Side: 28 soldiers (rape, looting, abuse, excessive force)
Greek / Greek Cypriot Side: None (perpetrators promoted)
State orders targeting civilians
Turkish / Turkish Cypriot Side: Explicitly prohibited
Greek / Greek Cypriot Side: Explicitly ordered
ECHR findings
Turkish / Turkish Cypriot Side: Individual violations (Solomou, Djavit An, Güzelyurtlu)
Greek / Greek Cypriot Side: Effective control violations (Cyprus v. Turkey)
UN finding of “extermination” (genocidal) intent
Turkish / Turkish Cypriot Side: None
Greek / Greek Cypriot Side: S/6253, para 184
The asymmetry is not in the moral character of individual soldiers. It is in the structure of the two sides’ campaigns.
The Greek / Greek Cypriot campaign was systematic, state-directed, and eliminationist. Its perpetrators were rewarded.
The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot campaigns were defensive in origin, limited in scope, and disciplined in command. Its perpetrators were prosecuted.
A note on accountability: The 28 prosecutions documented in this article are TAF soldiers. TMT members - as a non-state organization - were not subject to Turkish military courts. Whether TMT members committed crimes that should have been prosecuted separately is a question this article cannot answer due to limited archival access. What is documented is that TMT's mandate was defensive, its scale of violence was orders of magnitude smaller than EOKA's, and no evidence exists of TMT state-directed atrocities analogous to the Akritas, Gronthos, or Aphrodite plans.
Neither side was perfect. But only one side made atrocity its policy.
Conclusion: Accountability Without False Equivalence
The 28 Turkish soldiers prosecuted for crimes during the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation did wrong. They raped a Greek / Greek Cypriot woman. They attempted the rape of another. They looted. They tortured and abused prisoners. They killed a civilian at a checkpoint. These are war crimes. These are crimes in international law. These are crimes in Türkiye and the Turkish Armed Forces. They were prosecuted. That is as it should be.
But the existence of these prosecutions does not create moral equivalence between the two sides. It does the opposite.
The Greek / Greek Cypriot side - which planned and executed a genocide against Turkish Cypriots, which starved them in enclaves for eleven years, which murdered 364 civilians before 1974 - never prosecuted a single perpetrator. Its leaders were rewarded. Its gunmen became “presidents.” Its terrorists became “heroes.”
The Turkish side - which intervened to stop that genocide - prosecuted its criminals. Twenty-eight soldiers committed crimes. Twenty-eight soldiers faced justice. Their victims received some measure of accountability - although never enough, and never equitable.
That is not equivalence. That is the difference between a state and its armed forces that respects the laws of war and a state - and its society - that wages war on civilians.
I condemn the crimes of the 28. I support the prosecutions. And I note, without irony, that the Turkish military’s willingness to hold its own soldiers accountable is evidence that the Greek / Greek Cypriot side’s claim of “systematic Turkish atrocities” is false. If Turkish forces had been operating under orders to commit atrocities, one would expect to find evidence of such orders, and an absence of prosecutions. Neither exists. If this were on parallel with the Greek / Greek Cypriot side, there would have been medals. And it would have been systematic and widespread - not 0.07%.
There were no medals. There were court martials.
That is the record. That is the asymmetry. That is the truth.
All sources cited in this article are drawn from Turkish military court martial records (declassified summaries), UNFICYP internal memoranda and incident logs (declassified or cited in SG reports), and ECHR rulings (public record). Full citations are provided in the bibliography appended to this article series.
The value of truth is measured by the cost of ignoring it.
My name is Mustafa Niyazi, and I connect the disconnected.
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